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THE ANTI-INJUNCTION ACT

abuses of the law have occurred. It thus remains to be seen if the protracted
methods of legislative remedies will be sufficient or indeed capable of confronting these problems.
RICHARD CANDELORA

JOHN W. HAWxIS

CONSUMER PROTECTION UNDER THE FLORIDA CONSUMER
FINANCE ACT: ILLUSION OR REALITY?
Most informed people would agree that when the economic history
of the first half of this century is written, the expansion of consumer
credit will deserve at least a chapter.1
The amount of consumer credit outstanding in the United States has

increased more than twenty-fold since 1940.2 Present enjoyment of goods
and services that are to be paid for in the future is now commonplace. For
many purchasers, credit has become the rule rather than the exception.
Consumer credit legislation has been unable to keep pace with the
growth of the consumer credit industry.3 In the last decade, however, consumer credit legislation has become the subject of extensive scholarly comment,4 as well as the source of heated debate between "consumer protection
advocates" and the consumer credit industry.5 Additionally, two major pieces
1. P. McCRAcKEN, J. MAO & C. FRICKE, CONSUMER INSTALLMENT CREDTrr AND PUBLIC
PoLicy 1 (1965).
2. Consumer credit outstanding in 1940 was $8,338,000 compared to $180,486,000 at
the end of 1973. 60 F.DRAL RESERVE BULL. AS0 (No. 5, 1974).
3. B. CURRAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER CRErr LEGISLATION 2 (1965).
4. See, e.g., Curran, Legislative Controls as a Response to Consumer Credit Problems,
8 B.C. IND. & Comt. L. Rv. 409 (1967); Davis, Legislative Restrictions of Creditor Powers
and Remedies: A Case Study of the Negotiation and Drafting of the Wisconsin Consumer
Act, 72 MICH. L. REv. 3 (1973); Felsenfeld, Some Ruminations About Remedies in ConsumerCredit Transactions, 8 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REV. 535 (1967); Jordan & Warren, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 68 COLUM. L. Rinv. 387 (1968); Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A Creditor-Oriented Viewpoint, 68 COLUm. L. REV. 445 (1968); LoPucki, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code: Consumer's Code or Lender's Code?, 22 U. FL& L. REv. 335
(1970); Moo, Consumerism and the UCCC, 25 Bus. LAw 957 (1970); Symposium-Consumer
Credit Reform, 33 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 641-785 (1968); Symposium-Consumer Credit
Reform, Part 1, 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1-158 (1969); Id., Part II, at 272-339.
5. The most outspoken (and well-spoken) critic of consumer credit legislation is
Professor Homer Kripke of New York University School of Law. Professor Kripke was formerly associated with the consumer finance industry. See generally Kripke, supra note 4;
Kripke, Gesture and Reality in Consumer Credit Reform, 44 N.Y.U.L. 1Ev. 1 (1969).
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of uniform consumer credit legislation have been proposed and discussed.
The Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC)6 was promulgated by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. It has been
adopted in several states.7 The National Consumer Act (NCA),8 a product of
the National Consumer Law Center, resulted from the extensive debate on
the adequacy of the UCCC as a response to consumer problems.
The Florida Legislature has responded to the rising tide of consumer
protection activity by enacting the Florida Consumer Finance Act (FCFA). 9
The FCFA amended the existing Small Loan Act ° and repealed the Florida
Consumer Finance Law." The most significant aspects of the FCFA are the
provisions dealing with consumer credit protection.1 2 In this context, the
FCFA eliminates the holder in due course doctrine, a prohibits assignment of
wages,1 4 restricts the use of cross-collateral,15 limits deficiency judgments,1 6
and provides consumer credit counseling.",
The FCFA provisions that purport to eliminate the holder in due course
doctrine and waiver of defense clauses and to limit deficiency judgments are
of particular importance because they represent marked departures from
existing law. This note will analyze and evaluate these provisions, and, in addition, will discuss limitations in the Act that may drastically restrict its
coverage.
HOLDER

IN DUE COURSE AND THE

FCFA

Background
It is hard, and it becomes each year harder, for counsel to explain
convincingly why "the law" requires that a hard-pressed wage-earner
6.

UNIFORM

CONSUMER CREDIT CODE [hereinafter cited as UCCC]. Unless otherwise

indicated, references are to the 1969 Revised Final Draft.

7. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§73-1-101 to 73-12-105 (Supp. 1971); 5A IDAHO CODE
§§28-31-101 to 28-39-108 (Supp. 1973); InD. ANN. STAT. §§24-45-1-101 to 24-45-6-203 (Burns
1974); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, §§I-101 et seq. (1972); UTAH CODE ANN. §§70B-1-101 et seq.
(Supp. 1973); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§40-1-101 to 40-6-204 (Supp. 1971); Kan. Laws 1973, S. No. 18.
8. NATIONAL CONSUMER ACT [hereinafter cited as NCA]. Unless otherwise indicated,
references are to the 1970 First Final Draft.
9. FLA. STAT. §§516.001-.37 (1973). The FCFA was effective Oct. 1, 1973. Fla. Laws 1973,
ch. 73-192, §16, at 431.
10. Fla. Laws 1925, ch. 10,177, at 346.
11.

Fla. Laws 1949, ch. 25,343, at 751.

12. For a review of the FCFA as it applies to the entire range of consumer finance
activities, see Oeltjen, Florida's New Consumer Finance Act, or, Whatever Happened to
"Small" Loan Laws, 1 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 373 (1973).
13. FLA. STAT. §516.31(2) (1973).
14. FLA. STAT. §516.17 (1973). See generally Jordan & Warren, supra note 4, at 388
(discussion of assignment of wages limitations); LoPucki, supra note 4, at 346; Robertson,
Consumer Protection Under the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 41 Miss. L.J. 36, 70 (1969).
15. FLA. STAT. §516.31(4 ) (1973). See generally Kass, S. 2589 and the Uniform Consumer
Credit Code: A Comparison of Consumer Protections, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1131, 1143
(1969) (discussion of cross-collateral restrictions).
16. FLA. STAT. §516.31(3) (1973).
17. FLA. STAT. §516.32 (1973). See generally Oeltjen, supra note 12, at 427-29 (discussion of consumer credit counseling).
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who has been bilked by a now-insolvent seller into buying junk
masquerading as a television set or a washing machine must pay the
full price to a bank or finance company whose own relationship with
the fraudulent seller has been intimate, long-continued and profitable.1 8
The Florida Legislature has attempted to lift this burden of explanation
from the shoulders of counsel by changing the law that produced such inequitable results. 9 As a prelude to discussion of this recent legislative accomplishment, it will be helpful to review the history of "the law" of
negotiable instruments applicable in consumer credit transactions.
The heart of the law of negotiable instruments is the holder in due
course doctrine. The principal advantage of having a document designated
a negotiable instrument is that it passes as a substitute for money in the
20
commercial market, thereby facilitating the free flow of commerce.
The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) defines a "holder in due course"
as one who takes an instrument "for value, in good faith, and without notice
that it is overdue or has been dishonored or of any defense against or claim
to it on the part of any person." 2' The UCC definition of holder in due
course and the rights incident to that status were derived from the Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Act (UNIA), enacted in Florida as chapter 674 of
the Florida Statutes. 22 The importance of attaining holder in due course
status lies in the rights that accompany such status. The holder "takes the
instrument free from (1) all claims to it on the part of any person and (2) all
defenses of any party to the instrument with whom the holder has not
dealt," 23 with the exception of certain defenses going to the existence of the
instrument as a binding obligation. 24 Consumer concern with the pervasiveness of these rights focused as the growth of the consumer credit industry
produced close, working relationships between merchants and financers.
In the typical consumer credit transaction, a consumer-buyer purchases
goods or services for personal use from a merchant-seller. The buyer executes
a conditional sales contract and a promissory note evidencing the debt. This
note is then discounted and the contract assigned by the seller to a sales
finance company or to a bank. The bank or finance company, subject to
meeting the statutory requirements, takes this instrument as a holder in due
course. Once this occurs, the buyer's most effective tool for obtaining satisfaction from the goods he purchased-refusing to pay until the seller delivers
18. Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchaser, 63 YALE L.J. 1057,
1098 (1954).
19. FiA. STAT. §516.31(2) (1973).
20. IV. HAvKLAND, CoMMERCIAL PAPER 5 (1959).

21.

UNIFon

COMimRCAL CoDE

§3-302(1) [hereinafter cited as UCC]. All references

to the UCC are to the 1962 Final Draft, as codified in FLA. STAT. §§671.1-101 to
(1973).
22. Fla. Laws 1897, cl. 4524, at 25 (repealed 1967). Under ch. 4524, §57, the
due course held the instrument free from any defect of title of prior parties,
from defenses available to prior parties among themselves, and could enforce
of the instrument for the full amount against all parties liable.
23. UCC §3-305.
24. These exceptions are specified in UCC U-305(2).
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the goods and those goods perform as promised-is lost. The consumer, under
"the law," is obligated to pay the holder in due course the full amount
owing on the debt. The consumer's only remedy for breach of the sales contract is a suit against the seller, who may have absconded or become insolvent.
Historically, the justification for the holder in due course doctrine was
facilitation of the transferability of commercial paper.2 5 The above scenario
illustrates the difficulty courts had applying this commercial justification
to consumer credit transactions. In this context, the courts determined that
the central question should be one of policy: Who should bear the risk of
loss in case of default or fraud on the part of the seller, the innocent purchaser or the commercially sophisticated finance company? Widely disparate
answers to this question emerged from various jurisdictions.
The largest single obstacle confronting courts sympathetic to the needs
of the consumer was the subjective test developed to determine the requisite
"good faith" of a holder in due course. At common law only actual knowledge
of a notemaker's personal defenses would preclude holder in due course
status.2 6 The Supreme Court early recognized this common law test,27 but
subsequently courts in both the United States and England receded from it.28
The UNIA, the first uniform attempt to resolve problems in the law of
negotiable instruments, 29 incorporated the common law concept into its
definition of "holder in due course." 30 This definition became the rule in
Florida and was upheld as recently as 1968. 31 The drafters of the UCC,
which has replaced the UNIA in virtually all states, had the opportunity to
profit from voluminous commentary on this subject.2 2 Despite vigorous arguments to the contrary, the language ultimately adopted continued to call
33
for an "actual knowledge" test to determine a holder's good faith.
25. E.g., Cotton v. John Deere Plow Co., 246 Ala. 36, 39, 18 So. 2d 727, 729 (1944);
Griffin v. Baltimore Fed. Sav. 8: Loan Ass'n, 204 Md. 154, 159, 102 A.2d 804, 806 (1954).
26. Goodman v. Harvey, 4 Adm. & Ecc. 870, 111 Eng. Rep. 1011 (K.B. 1836).
27. Goodman v. Simonds, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 343 (1857).
28. See Gill v. Cubitt, 3 B. & C. 466, 107 Eng. Rep. 806 (K.B. 1824); Mee v. Carlson, 22
S.D. 365, 117 N.W. 1033 (1908). In Gill, the court held in favor of the maker of a note in
a suit brought by the holder, where the holder took the note under circumstances that
should have "aroused the suspicions of a prudent and careful man." (A man stole a bill
and discounted it to a broker who had heard of the theft and who recognized the thief's
features.) This "suspicious circumstances" test has been utilized as recently-Zas 1962 in
Westfield Inv. Co. v. Fellers, 74 N.J. Super. 575, 181 A.2d 809 (Super. Ct. 1962).
29. The UNIA was adopted in all states. 5 UNIFORm LAws ANN. at v (1943).
30. UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS Aer §52.
31. Baraban v. Manatee Nat'l Bank, 212 So. 2d 341 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1968). The court
held that actual knowledge, not due care or negligence, is the test for a holder's good
faith under FLA. STAT. §§674.54, .58 (1965).
32. See, e.g., Britton, Holder in Due Course-A Comparison of the Provisions of the
Negotiable Instruments Law with Those of Article 3 of the Proposed Commercial Code,
49 Nw. U.L. REv. 417 (1954); McKenna, Survey of Negotiable Instrument Laws in Florida,
12 U. MIAMI L. REv. 464 (1958); Morris, Negotiable Instruments Law Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 64 W. VA. L. REV. 457 (1962).
33. UCC §3-302. Under the 1952 draft of the UCC, the test was an objective one,
stating that a holder in due course is one who takes the instrument "in good faith in-
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This supposedly "settled" test meanwhile underwent radical alterations
at the hands of various courts throughout the country.34 Despite the existence
of clear statutory language, courts responded to consumer pleas and developed
several theories upon which relief could be granted to the unfortunate consumer. Under one such theory, the "principal-agent" rationale, 5 the seller
was deemed to be the agent of the finance company. Therefore, actual
knowledge of the seller was imputed to the finance company in order to
defeat the company's good faith defense. 36
Another line of reasoning was the "original party" theory. Under this
rationale, the finance company was precluded from achieving holder in due
course status by being found to have been an actual party to the sale.3 7 A
third distinction was based on the "dose connection" between the seller and
the finance company. 38 Under this theory, the more the finance company
knew about the underlying transaction, or controlled or participated in it,
the less it was able to assert a good faith purchase of the instrument.3 9
These three theories are pieces of a single puzzle. The desire, on the one
hand, to protect the consumer-purchaser from abusive practices and the
necessity, on the other hand, of preserving the free negotiability of commercial paper presented a serious policy problem that could not be resolved
by legalistic jargon. Finding the practicalities of the "close connection" theory
persuasive, the Supreme Court of Florida joined the ranks of courts resolving
this question on public policy grounds. The court flatly stated: "We think
the buyer-Mr. & Mrs. General Public-should have some protection somewhere along the line. We believe the finance company is better able to bear
the risk of the dealer's insolvency .... "40
cluding observance of the reasonable commercial standards of any business in which the
holder may be engaged." UCC §3-302(l)(b) (1952). Fear existed, however, that this objective test would result in more litigation than the "settled" rule of the UNIA, and the
language was removed from the 1962 Final Draft. See Britton, supra note 82.
84. See, e.g., Commercial Credit Corp. v. Childs, 199 Ark. 1978, 137 S.W.2d 260 (1940);
Commercial Credit Corp. v. Orange County Mach. Works, 34 Cal. 2d 766, 214 P.2d 819
(1950); Taylor v. Atlas Sec. Co., 213 Mo. App. 282, 249 S.W. 786 (1928).
35. For a more detailed discussion of these judicial theories, see Littlefield, Good Faith
Purchaser of Consumer Paper: The Failure of the Subjective Test, 89 S. CAL. L. REv. 48
(1966); Note, Consumer Protection: A Misallocation of Protection, 25 U. FIA. L. Rav. 160
(1972); Comment, Negotiable Instruments: Consumer Versus Financier in Consumer Goods
Financing-A Judicial Dilemma, 52 MARq. L. Ray. 285 (1968).
86. See, e.g., Calvert Credit Corp. v. Williams, 244 A.2d 494 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968); International Fin. Corp. v. Rieger, 272 Minn. 192, 137 N.W.2d 172 (1965).
87. E.g., Commercial Credit Corp. v. Childs, 199 Ark. 1073, 187 S.W.2d 260 (1940);
Jones v. Approved Bancredit Corp., 256 A,2d 789 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1969).
88. See, e.g., Taylor v. Atlas Sec. Co., 218 Mo. App. 282, 249 S.W. 746 (1928); Unico
v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 282 A.2d 405 (1967).
89. 50 NJ. at 109-23, 232 A.2d at 409-17.
40. Mutual Fin. Co. v. Martin, 63 So. 2d 649, 653 (Fla. 1953). The consumer in this
case refused to pay for a faulty deep freezer. The court held that because the note and
conditional sales agreement had been executed concurrently, the finance company had
investigated the maker's credit, furnished the note and an agreement containing the
company name, and approved the terms of the agreement, the company was not a holder
in, due course. Accord, Rehurek v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 262 So. 2d 452 (2d D.C.A. Fla.
1972); International Credit Co. v. Mike Bradford Co., 177 So. 2d 878 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1968).
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The result of this compassionate judicial tendency was "to defeat the
purpose of the UNIA by creating a hodgepodge of judicial socio-economic

41
policy superimposed on what should be a law of national uniformity." Con-

solidation of a uniformity in laws relating to consumers is still a laudable
goal. In light of these judicial decisions, however, such statutes can no
longer be couched in broad, ambivalent language; rather, they must be the
result of honest answers to basic policy questions.
Before discussing answers that have been proposed through the vehicle
of uniform acts, two related elements of the holder in due course doctrine
should be mentioned. The first is the so-called "shelter" rule,4 2 by which
one who takes an instrument from a holder in due course becomes a holder3
in due course regardless of whether he meets the statutory requirements.4
44
This rule can work even harsher results than the general doctrine.
Second, a variation of the holder in due course theme may be achieved
by the seller inserting a clause in the installment sales contract pursuant to
which the purchaser "agrees" not to assert any defenses he may have against
the seller in any suit on the contract by an assignee of the seller. These
provisions have been termed "waiver of defense" clauses. 4s The purpose of
these clauses is to obtain the same legal effect for certain nonnegotiable
instruments as the holder in due course doctrine achieves for negotiable
instruments. In attempting to balance the need to retain freedom to negotiate
by contract with the need to protect unwitting consumers, courts have upheld 46
and invalidated such clauses 4 7 on theories similar to those advanced with re-

gard to negotiable instruments. Additionally, the unconscionability provision of the UCC' s has provided a basis for consumer relief from such
provisions. 49 Aside from the unconscionability provision, the UCC generally
sanctions the validity of waiver of defense clauses5 ° but defers to any state
statute or decision establishing a different rule for buyers or lessees of consumer goods.51
The proliferation of the consumer credit industry52 has generated demands
for the formulation of uniform standards to govern consumer credit activity
41.

Britton, Holder in Due Course-A Comparison of the Provisions of the Negotiable

Instruments Law with Those of Article 3 of the Proposed Commercial Code, 72 BANKINC
L.J. 305, 317 (1955).
42. UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS AcT §58; UCC §3-201(1).
43.
44.
45.

UCC §3-201, Comment 3.
Id. example A.
See Beutel, Negotiability by Contract, 28 ILL. L. REv. 205 (1933); Na"in, Waiver

of Defense Clauses in Consumer Contracts, 48 N.C.L. RExV. 505

(1970).

46. E.g., Jennings v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 442 SAV.2d 565 (Ky. 1969); Lundstrom v. Radio Corp. of America, 17 Utah 2d 114, 405 P.2d 339 (1965).
47. E.g., Fairfield Credit Corp. v. Donnelly, 158 Conn. 543, 264 A.2d 547 (1969); Dean
v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 114 N.J. Super. 132, 275 A.2d 154 (Super. Ct. 1971).

48. UCC §2-302.
49. See, e.g., Rehurek v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 262 So. 2d 452 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1972);
Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
50.

See, e.g., UCO §9-206.

51. Id. UCC §9-109(1) defines consumer goods to include goods used or bought for
use primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.
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and to replace the patchwork quilt of current state laws. The first response
to such demands was the UCCG. The product of years of labor and debate,
this pioneering venture was necessarily characterized by compromise. As a
result, the 1969 proposed final draft was met with criticism from all sides
and has been substantially reworked during the past five years.53
The major provision of the proposed UCCG dealing with the holder in
due course problem is section 2.403. 54 This provision prohibits a seller in a
consumer credit sale 55 or consumer lease 56 from accepting any negotiable
instrument other than a check as payment for his goods or services. While
this appears to prevent the circumstances necessary to create holder in due
course status, two major problems remain.
First, the language "a holder is not in good faith if he takes a negotiable
instrument with notice that it is issued in violation of this section" leaves unanswered the question whether the objective or subjective test to determine
good faith should be applied. Second, and more important, this section does
not deal at all with consumer loans. 57 This loophole allows the merchant-lender team 58 to avoid the prohibitions of the section by arranging for the consumer to borrow directly from the finance company, using the cash loan to
52. See note 2 supra.
53. For more detail*on the latest redraft, see Miller & Warren, A Report on the Revision of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 27 On-A. L. Rv. 1 (1974).
54. "In a consumer credit sale or consumer lease, other than a sale or lease primarily
for an agricultural purpose, the seller or lessor may not take a negotiable instrument other
than a check as evidence of the obligation of the buyer or lessee. A holder is not in good
faith if he takes a negotiable instrument with notice that it is issued in violation of this
section. A holder in due course is not subject to the liabilities set forth in the provisions
on the effect of violations on rights of parties (section 5.202) and the provisions on civil
actions by Administrator (Section 6.113)." UCCC §2.403.
55. The UCCO defines consumer credit sale as "a sale of goods, services, or an
interest in land in which (a) credit is granted by a person who regularly engages as a
seller in credit transactions of the same kind, (b) the buyer is a person other than an
organization, (c) the goods, services, or interest in land are purchased primarily for a
personal, family, household, or agricultural purpose, (d) either the debt is payable in
installments or a credit service charge is made, and (e) with respect to a sale of goods
... UCCO §2.104.
or services, the amount financed does not exceed $25,000.
56. The UCCC defines a consumer lease as "a lease of goods (a) which a lessor regularly
engaged in the business of leasing makes to a person, other than an organization, who
takes under the lease primarily for a personal, family, household, or agricultural purpose,
(b) in which the amount payable under the lease does not exceed $25,000, and (c) which
is for a term exceeding four months .... ." UCCO §2.106.
57. "Consumer loan" is defined in UCCC §3.104 as a loan made by a person regularly
engaged in the business of making loans. The transaction must meet the same qualifications
as a consumer credit sale as defined in UCCC §2.104, note 55 supra.
58. A dealer's business is not that of lending money-he makes his profit on sales
of goods and services. He therefore establishes arrangements under which the finance industry purchases the dealer's consumer paper at a discount and also helps finance the
seller's inventory purchases. These arrangements have proved mutually beneficial to sellers
and financers, and have developed a mutuality of interest in consumer transactions. See
generally C. PHELPs, Tim ROLz OF SALS FINANCING COMPANIES IN THE AMUaCAN ECONOMY
(1952); Littlefield, PreservingConsumer Defenses: Plugging the Loophole in the New UCCC,
44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 272 (1969).
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pay for his consumer purchase.59 This is accomplished by drafting a sales
contract that makes the intended assignee instead a lender.
Such easy avoidance of the UCCC's sanctions prompted critics to propose
the consumer-oriented NCA. NCA section 2.40560 prohibits the taking of any
instrument payable "to order or to bearer" in any consumer credit transaction.61 The official comment to this section indicates that this prohibition

destroys the negotiability of such instruments under article 3 of the UCC.
Also, unlike its UCCC counterpart, NCA section 2.405 subjects a holder
taking such an instrument in violation of its mandates to all defenses of the
consumer, foreclosing the possibility that such an instrument could even be
62
taken in good faith.
In the related problem area of waiver of defense clauses, the NCA again
has more teeth than the UCCC. The UCCC establishes two alternatives
within section 2.404, either of which may be chosen by enacting states. 63 Alternative A subjects an assignee to all claims and defenses of the "seller or
64
lessor" regardless of any contractual clause purporting to waive such rights.
Alternative B, however, permits these defenses to be asserted against an
65
assignee only if requisite notice is given by the buyer to such assignee.
The protection afforded by any notice statute is quite illusory, particularly
in the case of the unsophisticated buyer who not only is expected to read the
fine print of the sales contract, but also to understand it. Specific weaknesses
59. See Littlefield, supra note 58, at 272-73.
60. "(1) No merchant shall take or otherwise arrange for the consumer to sign an
instrument payable 'to order' or 'to bearer' as evidence of the credit obligation of the consumer in a consumer credit transaction. (2) Any holder of an instrument, contract, or other
writing evidencing an obligation of the consumer takes it subject to all claims and defenses
of the consumer up to the amount of the transaction total arising out of the transaction
whether or not it is payable 'to order' or 'to bearer.' (3) Taking or otherwise arranging for
the consumer to sign an instrument in violation of this Section shall be subject to the
provisions of Section 5.304." NCA §2.405.
61. "Consumer credit transaction" is defined in the NCA as "a transaction between a
merchant and a consumer in which real or personal property, services or money is acquired
on credit and the consumer's obligation is payable in. installments. The term includes consumer credit sales, consumer loans, consumer leases and transactions pursuant to a seller
or lender credit card." NCA §1.30(10).
62. NCA §2.405(2). This subsection makes each holder liable up to the amount of the
transaction at its inception. NCA §2.405, Comment 2.
63. Alternative A was adopted in Idaho, 5A IDAHO CODE §28-32-404 (Supp. 1973) and
Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. §70B-2-404 (Supp. 1973); alternative B in Indiana, IND. ANN. STAT.
§24-4.5-2-404 (Burns 1974); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, §2-404 (1972); Wyoming,
Wyo. STAT. ANN. §40-2-404 (Supp. 1971). Colorado omits both alternatives A and B.
64. Once again, loans are excluded; see text accompanying notes 57-59 supra.
65. Alternative B is based on similar statutes enacted in other states but allows a longer
period in which notice may be asserted. The UCCC permits three months before the
consumer's defenses are cut off. Other state statutes and their notice periods include: DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 6, §4312 (Supp. 1970) (15 days); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 121-V, §262D (SmithHurd Supp. 1971) (15 days); N.Y. PERs PRoP. LAW §403.3 (McKinney 1962) (10 days); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 69, §1402 (Supp. 1972) (15 days); Tax. Rv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6.07 (1967)
(30 days). The three states adopting UCCC §2.404, alt. B, all changed the suggested threemonth period. E.g., IND. ANN. STAT. §24-4.5-2-404 (Burns 1974) (60 days); OKa. STAT. ANN.
tit. 14A, §2-404 (Supp. 1971) (45 days).
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of "notice" statutes include: (1) consumer defenses can be cut off after a
specific time, (2) notice may be ineffective to explain to the consumer his
rights, (3) the statute gives the consumer the impression that his rights have
been waived, and (4) the consumer needs to take quick and affirmative action
in these circumstances." The NCA succinctly abolishes the use of waiver
of defense clauses, regardless of the circumstances.67
In addition to its stronger provisions dealing directly with the holder in
due course doctrine and waiver of defense clauses, the NCA travels the extra
mile necessary to plug the loophole created by the UCCC in the area of consumer loans.68 NCA section 2.407 codifies the "original party" and "close
connection" theories, 69 subjecting direct lenders to consumer defenses arising
from the purchase of consumer goods with the proceeds of that loan if the
requisite close connection is found70 These provisions protect the consumer
to the fullest necessary extent. The NCA, with its strong consumer orientation, has not been enacted by a single legislature. The compromising UCCC,
however, has been adopted by seven states. 7'
FCFA
Florida has been able to benefit from discussion of the relative merits
of these acts.72 Law review commentary has delved into every facet of consumer credit, exposing virtually all the areas that demand legislative atten-

66. See Comment, Consumer Protection Under the UCCC and the NCA-A Comparison
and Recommendations, 12 ARiz. L. REV. 575, 591 (1970).
67. NCA §2A06 provides: "Notwithstanding any term or agreement to the contrary,
an assignee of the rights of the creditor is subject to all claims and defenses of the consumer, up to the amount of the transaction total, arising out of a consumer credit transaction."
68. NCA §2.497 provides: "(1) The creditor in consumer loan transactions shall be
subject to all of the claims and defenses of the consumer up to the total amount financed,
arising from the consumer sale or lease for which the proceeds of the loan are used, if the
creditor participated in or was connected with the consumer sale or lease transaction. (2)
Without limiting the scope of subsection (1), the creditor participates in or is connected
with a consumer sale or lease transaction when: (a) the creditor is a person related to
the seller or lessor; or (b) the seller or lessor prepares documents used in connection with
the loans; or (c) the creditor supplies forms to the seller or lessor used by the consumer in
obtaining the loan; or (d) the creditor makes 20 or more loans in any calendar year, the
proceeds of which are used in transactions with the same seller or lessor, or with a person
related to the same seller or lessor, or (e) the consumer is referred to the creditor by
the seller or lessor; or (f) the creditor, directly or indirectly pays the seller or lessor any
consideration whether or not it is in connection with the particular transaction; or (g) the
creditor is the issuer of a credit card which may be used by the consumer in the consumer
sale or lease as a result of a prior agreement between the issuer and the seller or lessor."
69. See text accompanying notes 37-38 supra.
70. The factors determinative of a "close connection" are listed in NCA §2.407(2),
note 68 supra.
71. See note 7 supra.
72. The UCCO was introduced in both branches of the Florida Legislature in 197t.
FLA. S. JouR. 1136 (Reg. Sess. 1972, introduced by Comm. on Commerce); FLA. H.R. JoUt.
3182 (Reg. Sess. 1972, introduced by Rep. Forbes et al.). Neither bill passed.
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tion.7 3 Cognizant of this demand, the Florida Legislature, in 1973, enacted
the Florida Consumer Finance Act. 74 The holder in due course selection of
this Act states:
A holder or assignee of any negotiable instrument or installment contract, other than a currently dated check, which originated from the
purchase of certain consumer goods or services is subject to all claims
and defenses of the consumer debtor against the seller of those consumer goods or services. A person's liability under this section may
not exceed the amount owing 7to the person when the claim or defense
is asserted against the person.

5

To determine the intended meaning of this section it is necessary to pinpoint the origin of the language. Although nearly every state has struggled to
enact provisions of like import,76 Florida's choice of terminology in section
516.31(2) appears to be a distillation of language found in the UCCC. 77 The

FCFA purports to wipe out usage of both the holder in due course doctrine
and waiver of defense clauses. Additionally, the consumer may assert any
defenses he might have against the seller and raise any claims that he may
have against the seller for defects in the goods or services. The generosity
evidenced by allowing the debtor to press his claims against the seller through
the holder is offset by the fact that the holder's liability under this section is
limited to the amount owing at the time the claim or defense is asserted
against him.75 Thus, the debtor may be relieved of his obligation, but still
be left with defective goods. Both the UCCC7 9 and NCA 80 have remedial provisions that allow the debtor to recover an amount that more closely reflects
actual damages.
The intended effect of the holder in due course provision of the FCFA is the
elimination of the legal devices that have shielded creditors from actions by
debtors for decades. This section suffers, however, from the same problem
that plagued the holder in due course section of the UCCC. The language
utilized has left a loophole through which less than scrupulous merchants
and lenders may escape the coverage of the section.81 In order to close this
73. See, e.g., Black, State Variations of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code-The Case
for Legislative Restraint, 48 DENVER L.J. 239 (1971); LoPucki, supra note 4; Murphy, Another "Assault Upon the Citadel": Limiting the Use of Negotiable Notes and Waiver-of-Defense Clauses in Consumer Sales, 29 OHIo ST. L.J. 667 (1968).
74. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-192, at 523.
75. FLA. STAT. §516.31(2) (1973).
76. For a more detailed treatment of the legislation in other states, see Oeltjen, supra
note 12, at 493 & n.153.
77. See UCCC §§2.403, A04, alt. A.
78. FLA. STAT. §516.31(2) (1973).
79. UCCC §5.202 provides that if a creditor violates the provisions of §2.403, the
debtor not only has a right not to pay the credit service charge or loan finance charge,
but also has the right to collect three times the amount of such charge as a penalty.
80. NCA §2.405 subjects the holder to all claims and defenses of the consumer up to
the amount of the "transaction total" (the original purchase price) rather than just the
balance due as under the FCFA.
81. See Littlefield, supra note 58. at 272.
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loophole, the language of this section should be interpreted to include "consumer loans"8 2 within its ambit. A liberal construction of the phrase "which
originated from the purchase of consumer goods or services" might include
consumer loans utilized directly for the purchase of specific goods or services.11 This interpretation would give the holder in due course provision
its desired effect, but would involve a considerable stretching of the language.8 4
A change in the phraseology of the section, rather than reliance on judicial
construction, will more than likely be necessary to effectuate the intent of the
drafters.
The historical distinctions between direct consumer loans and retail
installment credit sales have withered on the vine of time. Initially, the cry
for statutory reform spread as a result of abuses in the so-called "small loan"
business. 85 States enacted "small loan acts" to cope with these abuses long
before retail installment financing became widespread.8 6 The distinction was
further nurtured by judicial holdings that the difference between the "credit
price" and the "cash price" in a credit sale did not amount to interest, but
's
was merely a "time-price differential."
A consumer credit transaction is one in which funds or goods are acquired for personal use in return for a promise to pay for the same in the
future.8 8 The "time-price differential" is actually a charge for the use of the
purchase price during the term of the contract. This is interest in exactly
the same way that loan companies charge interest for the use of their money,
and, therefore, should be subject to the same restrictions. The time has come
to bury this meaningless distinction, which has fostered separate sets of laws
for consumer loans and consumer sales. In the consumer context, loans and
sales are two sides of the same coin and must be treated as such in order
to draft a comprehensive consumer protection statute.8 9
Choice of the method by which to dose this loophole and provide a
comprehensive consumer protection statute presents the same basic question
of policy that troubled the courts in their deliberations under earlier guidelines-whether the finance company or the consumer should bear the risk
of loss from a fraudulent or insolvent seller. The uniform response has been
that the finance company should bear the loss.90 Many reasons justify this
82. See note 57 supra.

83. See Oeltjen, supra note 12, at 406.
84. Id.

85. See note 197 infra.
86. See generally B. CURPaN, supra note 3, at 16.
87. See, e.g., Pacific Indus., Inc. v. Mountain Inn, Inc., 232 F. Supp. 801, 806 (W.D.
Ark. 1964); Theodore Roosevelt Agency, Inc. v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 156
Colo. 237, 239, 398 P.2d 965, 966 (1965); General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Lunsford, 209 Va.
743, 748, 167 S.E.2d 414, 418 (1969).
88. McEwen, Economic Issues in State Regulation of Consumer Credit, 8 B.C. IND. &
CoM. L. Ragv. 387, 390 (1967).
89. See Littlefield, Parties and Transactions Covered by Consumer Credit Legislation,

8 B.C. IND. & Cost. L. REv. 463, 469 (1957); McEwen, supra note 88, at 390.
90. Even consumer credit legislation critic Homer Kripke, agrees that the time of the
freedom from defenses rule has run out. Kripke, supra note 4, at 470-73.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1975

11

Florida Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 2 [1975], Art. 6
466

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVII

answer. First, the finance company is financially more capable of bearing
the loss than the consumer2 t Second, the finance company is better able to
investigate the business practices of any seller from whom it desires to purchase consumer paper.9 2 Third, a finance company may protect itself through
various contractual devices, such as purchase of the paper with full recourse
against the sellerY3 Finance companies, on the other hand, have argued
that they are grantors of credit, not sellers of goods or services, and that
buyers have the right and power to choose sellers and should thus look solely
to sellers for violations of sales contracts and breaches of warranty.9 4 While
these arguments have superficial appeal, the relationship between financiers
and merchants is often too close to leave any room for consideration of the
consumer's plight.
The major thrust of the finance industry's arguments is not counter to the
need for such consumer protection, but rather is focused on the increased
cost that such protection would necessitate9 By conditioning a finance
company's liability on the seller's adequate performance, consumer protection
statutes force financiers to screen more fully the dealers applying for financing
and to refuse to finance the sales of fraudulent sellers. The questions raised
by this process are: How much constriction of consumer credit will result,
and what will be the increased costs of available credit to consumers?
Many sellers need ready cash with which to operate their businesses and
will not sell merchandise on credit without knowing that they can obtain
cash by discounting notes to finance companies.96 By making it tougher for
merchants to sell consumer paper, these laws may restrict the supply of
available consumer credit. Results of studies in areas where laws similar to
the FCFA have been enacted, however, have been inconclusive in this regard.97 The suggestion has even been advanced that thorough consumer
protection laws would make the consumer credit industry more competitive,
thereby actually reducing the cost of credit and increasing its availability.9 8

91. For judicial recognition of this point, see Mutual Fin. Co. v. Martin, 63 So. 2d
649, 653 (Fla. 1953).
92. See Buffalo Indus. Bank v. DeMarzio, 162 Misc. 742, 296 N.Y.S. 783 (Buffalo City
Ct.), rev'd on other grounds, 6 N.Y.S.2d 568 (Sup. Ct. 1937).

93. This can be accomplished because the finance company exercises bargaining power
over the merchant, something the consumer is almost completely without. See Note,
Consumer Sales Financing: Placing the Risk for Defective Goods, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 782

(1943).
94.

See H. KRIPKE, CONSUMER CREDIT 260-61

(1970).

95. Murphy, supra note 73, at 687; Shay, The Impact of the Uniform Consumer Credit
Code on the Market for Consumer Installment Credit, 33 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 752,
762 (1968).
96.

C. PHELPS, INSTALLMENT SALES FINANCING: ITS SERVICES TO THE DEALER 13 (1953).

97. It is argued that adoption of the UCCC will lead to some curtailment in the
availability of credit and, at the same time, will increase the cost of credit. Shay, supra
note 95, at 762. See also Note, A Case Study of the Impact of Consumer Legislation: The

Elimination of Negotiability and the Cooling Off Process, 78 YALE L.J. 618 (1969).
98. Shay, supra note 95, at 952. Turner & Forbes, The Florida Consumer Finance Act
of 1973: Consumerism and the Industry, 27 PERSONAL FIN. L.Q. REP. 111, 112 (1973).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol27/iss2/6

12

Rosenbloum and Cramer: Consumer Protection Under the Florida Consumer Finance Act: Illus
1975]

CONSUMER PROTECTION

Regardless, the common business enterprise existing between finance
companies and merchants must remain the axis upon which evaluation of
the substance of justifications advanced by the finance industry revolves.
The language of NCA section 2.4079 is ideally suited to complete the
needed coverage of the holder in due course provision of the FCFA. This
codification of the "close connection" theory, with its specific enumeration
of factors, leaves little leeway for circumvention. Recognition of the uniformity
of consumer loans and consumer sales transactions requires that this language
immediately be appended to section 516.31 of the FCFA. Lenders who
legitimately lend cash to consumers for no particular purpose need not fear
that this inclusion will reach them at some future time when the borrower
becomes irate with his purchase from those funds. The statutory language
has a specific transaction as its target and is drawn narrowly enough to accomplish its goal without unduly interfering with the flow of credit or general
negotiability of commercial paper. As an underlying basis to support the
claim that the money world is able to recognize the difference between consumer paper and other negotiable paper, the Federal Reserve Board has been
able to trace the movement of consumer paper distinct from general commercial transactions. 00
Other proposals have been advanced in this context that are thought
to provide comprehensive protection for the consumer. 101 One such plan
simultaneously attempts to preserve the holder in due course doctrine and
consumer defenses, rather than treating them as mutually exclusive.1 02 The
thrust of this plan is to establish a state Consumer Protection Agency and to
require all merchants to post bond with it as a prerequisite for doing
business.' 0 ' Under this proposed system, a consumer could join the seller
as a third party defendant to the holder's action on the debt and if the
seller is unavailable or insolvent, the Consumer Protection Agency could be
04
served as the statutory agent.
Several problems are inherent in this scheme. The administrative process
necessary to make such a proposal function would result in a colossal
bureaucracy, with resultant costs to the taxpaying public. Additionally, the
bond requirement would pose an intolerable burden on new businesses
attempting to get off to a solid financial start. Thus, it appears that the
addition of the language of NCA, section 2.407, to the holder in due course
provision of the FCFA is best suited to serve the interests of both consumers and the consumer credit industry.

99. See note 68 supra.
100. See 60 FEDERAL RIESERVE BULL. A50 (No. 5, 1974).
101. One proposal states: "[A] lender subject to this Act who loans money to the
debtor knowing it will be used as the purchase price of specific consumer goods is subject
to all claims...." Littlefield, supra note 89, at 469.

102. Comment, supra note 66, at 590.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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Background
Another section of the FCFA representing an important change in existing law concerns deficiency judgments. 10 5 A deficiency judgment or deficiency
decree is defined as the balance of indebtedness due after applying the
proceeds of the sale of collateral to such indebtedness. 10 6 The equity power of
a court to render a deficiency judgment reflects the undesirability of encumbering the parties with the expense and inconvenience of an additional
suit at law to collect a deficiency.1 0 7 Although most of the litigation in the
area has involved real property mortgages, the same rules apply to chattel
mortgages. 108
Under the chattel mortgage theory, legal title remained in the mortgagor
and the mortgagee held an equitable lien.' 0 9 Upon default, the mortgagee
could pursue several remedies, if they were consistent." 0 No inconsistency was
inherent in repossessing the collateral subject to judicial foreclosure and then
seeking a deficiency judgment if the proceeds from the sale of the collateral
were inadequate to satisfy the debt."' If, however, the mortgagee proceeded
outside judicial foreclosure he was precluded from obtaining a deficiency
2
judgment."
In a suit for foreclosure of a chattel mortgage, pre-UCC law granted the
trial judge discretion to enter a deficiency judgment if a deficiency were
found to exist. 113 This discretion was "not . . . absolute and unbridled . . .

105. FLA. STAT. §516.31(3) (1973).
106. Grace v. Hendricks, 103 Fla. 1158, 1168-69, 140 So. 790, 794 (1932); Commercial
Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 80 Fla. 685, 689, 87 So. 315, 316 (1920).
107. Waybright v. Turner, 129 Fla. 310, 317, 176 So. 424, 427 (1937); Younghusband
v. Fort Pierce Bank & Trust Co., 100 Fla. 1088, 1093, 130 So. 725, 727 (1930); Etter v.
State Bank, 76 Fla. 203, 211, 79 So. 724, 726 (1918).
108. See FLA. STAT. §697.01(1973). This statute relating to instruments deemed mortgages
is applicable to both real and personal property. Bemort, Inc. v. Deerfield Beach Bank, 134
So. 2d 28, 30 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1961). The term "chattel mortgage" has been superseded by
the UCC's designation of chattel mortgages, as well as other pre-Code security devices, as
"security interests." FLA. STAT. §§671.201, 679.102 (1973).
109. See, e.g., Intertype Corp. v. Pulver, 2 F. Supp. 4, 7 (S.D. Fla. 1932); Voges v.
Ward, 98 Fla. 305, 320, 123 So. 785, 790 (1929); FLA. STAT. §697.02 (1973).
110. Boyette v. Reliable Fin. Co., 184 So. 2d 200, 201 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1966).
111. Id. See also Four Star Aviation, Inc. v. United States, 409 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1969);
Bemort, Inc. v. Deerfield Beach Bank, 134 So. 2d 28 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1961).
112. Four Star Aviation, Inc. v. United States, 409 F.2d 292, 293 (5th Cir. 1969); Bemort,
Inc. v. Deerfield Beach Bank, 134 So. 2d 28 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1961). A "power of sale," except
for limited circumstances, was not a method of foreclosure that could serve as the basis
for a deficiency judgment. Compare Wylly-Gabbet Co. v. Williams, 53 Fla. 872, 42 So. 910
(1907), with Mercantile Exch. Bank v. Taylor, 51 Fla. 473, 41 So. 22 (1906).
113. FLA. STAT. §702.06 (1973) provides: "In all suits for the foreclosure of mortgages
• . . the entry of a deficiency decree for any portion of a deficiency, should one exist, shall
be within the sound judicial discretion of the court, but the complainant shall also have
the right to sue at common law to recover such deficiency." This statute was applicable
to chattel mortgages as well as to real property mortgages. See, e.g., Scheneman v. Barnett,
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but one which must be supported by established equitable principles."114
The mortgagee could maintain an action at law if a deficiency judgment
were neither pleaded nor adjudicated in the foreclosure action.11 5 The same
equitable considerations sufficient to limit a deficiency award at equity wouldalso serve to defeat an action at law. 116
The conditional sales contract was another device frequently used in consumer sales. The holder of a conditional sales contract retained legal title to
the item sold until the entire purchase price was paid. 1 7 If the buyer defaulted
on his obligation, the seller or holder of the conditional sales contract proceeded subject to the doctrine of election of remedies.118 This well-settled rule,
required the seller to choose -between repossessing the collateral and, suing
on the debt." 9 If the seller chose, repossession and the proceeds from sale
of -the property-were insufficient -to -satisfy:the debt, he was -precluded -from
seeking a:deficiency judgment.2
-.
This election-of remedies doctrine was, harshly criticized because -it- forced.
the creditor to speculate whether it would.be more profitable to repossess
the collateral- or to commence- a -suit on the debtj 2' Accordingly, the UCG
abrogated the.doctrine of election-of remedies 22 and eliminated the technical
distinctions between various security devices.123 Under the UCO, the secured

53 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 1951). But see Comment, Practical Aspects of the Statutory Requirements Concerning Diligent Search and Deficiency Decrees, 16 U. MIAmI L. REv. 745, 752 &

n.44 (1962).
114. Scheneman v. Barnett, 53 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 1951); accord, Galloway v. Musgrave,
154 So. 2d 846, 851 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1963); Carlson v. Becker, 45 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 1950);
Taylor v. Prine, 101 Fla. 967, 969, 132 So. 464, 465 (1931).
115. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Consolidated Dev. Corp., 195 So. 2d 856 (Fla.
1967); McLarty v. Foremost Dairies, Inc., 57 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 1952); FLA. STAT. §702.06 (1973).
116. Frumkes v. Mortgage Guar. Corp., 173 So. 2d 738 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
117. E.g., Intertype Corp. v. Pulver, 2 F. Supp. 4, 7 (S.D. Fla. 1932); Voges v. Ward, 98
Fla. 305, 317, 123 So. 785, 790 (1929).
118.

See generally Comment, Conditional Sales-Remedies of the Seller in.'Florida, 7

U. MLmei L. REv. 385; 386 (1953).,
119. E.g., Baer v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., -101 Fla. 913, 921, 132 So. 817,
821 (1931); Voges v. Ward, 98 Fla. 305, 328, 123 So. 785, 793' (1929); Helton v. Sinclair,
93 Fla. 1121, 1126, 113 So. 568, 570 (1927).
120. Ad. See also 2 G. GmMoRE, SECURrrY IN'EEsrs iN PERSONAL PROPERTY 1182 (1965).
121. Note, Debtor's Rights Against a Deficiency Judgment Under Article 9, 16 HOWARD
L.J. 148, 155 (1970). A further criticism of the doctrine of election of remedies was that it
allowed an unsecured creditor to sue on the debt, levy on and dispose of the collateral,
and then seek a deficiency. The secured creditor, on the other hand, had to be satisfied
with repossession or suit. Felsenfeld, supra note 4, at 557.
122. Williams v. Westinghouse Credit Corp., 250 Ark. 1065, 1071, 468 S.W.2d 761, 764
(1971); Swindel v. General Fin. Corp., 265 So. 2d 393, 394-95 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1972); UCC
§9-501(1).

123. UCC §9-102(2).
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party 2 4 may repossess the collateral"'5 and dispose of the goods by sale. 26 If
the proceeds are less than the balance due, the secured party may obtain a
deficiency judgment. 1 -- The UCC also entitles the debtor to any surplus 12
from the disposition of his collateral, but "the surplus to be returned to
the debtor after the sale is a glittering mirage, the deficiency judgment in
29
favor of the creditor is the grim reality.'
A sale of the collateral must meet the test of "commercial reasonableness." 130 This requirement affords some protection to the debtor. The creditor's
compliance with this standard may be determinative of the sales price of
the collateral, which in turn will determine the extent of any deficiency. The
UCC offers criteria for determining commercial reasonableness including
sales of the collateral in the "usual manner" in a "recognized market," 13'
selling at "current" prices, and adherence to "reasonable commercial practices" among dealers in the particular kind of property." 2 Given the vagueness
of these criteria, courts have generally looked to the circumstances in each
case to determine whether the sale was conducted properly. Factors given
consideration have included whether the sale was public or private and the
amount of advertising accompanying the sale, 33 the fair market value of the
collateral compared to the actual sales price, 13 4 and prevailing trade
5
practices."

124. "Secured party" is defined as "a lender, seller, or other person in whose favor
there is a security interest, including a person to whom accounts, contract rights or chattel
paper have been sold." UCC §9-105(l)(m).
125. The secured party ma) repossess the collateral without judicial process if this
can be accomplished without a breach of the peace. UCC §9-503. Florida courts have upheld
the constitutionality of this provision. McCormick v. First Nat'l Bank, 322 F. Supp. 604
(1971); Northside Motors v. Brinkley, 282 So. 2d 617 (Fla. 1973).
126. UCC §9-504(1). The secured party has several other remedies available. See 2 G.
GILMORE, supra note 120, at 1229.
127. Atlas Thrift Co. v. Horan, 27 Cal. App. 3d 999, 1004, 104 Cal. Rptr. 313 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1972); Swindel v. General Fin. Corp., 265 So. 2d 393, 394 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1972);
Brunswick Corp. v. Starlite Lanes. Inc., 33 Mich. App. 490, 494, 190 N.W.2d 302, 304 (1971);
Conti Causeway Ford v. Jarossy, 114 N.J. Super. 382, 385, 276 A.2d 402, 404 (Dist. Ct. 1971);
UCC §9-504(2).

128. 2 G.

GILMORE,

supra note 120, at 1188.

129. Id.
130. UCC §9-504(1). The secured party may be liable to the debtor for damages if he
does not proceed with commercial reasonableness. UCC §9-507(1). Florida courts prior to the
UCC recognized that a creditor must proceed in a commercially reasonable manner. See,
e.g., C.I.T. Corp. v. Brewer, 146 Fla. 247, 200 So. 910 (1941).
131. "Recognized markets" in Florida are limited to widely recognized, regulated
stock and commodity exchanges. Turk v. St. Petersburg Bank & Trust Co., 281 So. 2d 534,
536 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1973) (automobile auction held not a recognized market). See also
Shuchman, Profit on Default: An Archival Study of Automobile Repossession and Resale,
22 STAN. L. RFv. 20, 51 & n.127 (1969).
132. UCC §9-507(2).
133. Reed v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 434 Pa. 212, 253 A.2d 101 (1969).
134. Vic Hansen & Sons, Inc. v. Crowley, 57 Wis. 2d 106, 203 N.W.2d 728 (1973).
135. Mallicoat v. Volunteer Fin. & Loan Corp., 57 Tenn. App. 1061, 415 S.W.2d 347
(1966).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol27/iss2/6

16

Rosenbloum and Cramer: Consumer Protection Under the Florida Consumer Finance Act: Illus
1975]

CONSUMER PROTECTION

The question of a debtor's liability for a deficiency judgment where the
creditor fails to comply with the standard of commercial reasonableness received no specific treatment in the UCC. Courts have held, however, that
compliance with another of the creditor's duties, giving notice of the sale
to the debtor,136 is a condition precedent to obtaining a deficiency judgment. 3 7 A logical conclusion that follows from this standard is that a commercially reasonable sale is also a condition precedent to obtaining a deficiency
8
judgment.13
Despite these controls, all too frequently the sales price of the collateral
is well below the unpaid balance. 3 9 This fact, coupled with the charges
against the debtor that are incidental to the sale, 140 has led to the entry of
large, oppressive deficiency judgments against the debtor.
These potential hardships are illustrated by Imperial Discount Corp. v.
Aiken.' 41 In Aiken, the debtor executed a retail installment contract for the
purchase of an automobile battery at a sales price of $29.30 plus "credit
charges of $5.70 for a total contract price of $35.00. The contract contained
a fine print provision pursuant to which the debtor's automobile secured
his performance. The debtor defaulted owing only $11.75. The creditor
promptly repossessed the debtor's 1955 automobile and sold it at an auction
for $50.00. The creditor alleged attorney's fees of $16.80, a repossession fee
of $45.00, an auctioneer's fee of $35.50, and storage charges of $70.00. Deducting the $50.00 credited to the debtor for the sale of the automobile, the
creditor prayed for a deficiency judgment of $128.80. This amount was four
times the original cost of the battery and the debtor no longer owned the
battery or his carl
The Aiken court was "shocked by the mountainous pyramiding of charges
imposed on a defaulting installment buyer."'' 42 The results of this transaction
were characterized as "oppressive, confiscatory, and unconscionable,"' 43 and
136. UCC §9-504(3).
137. In Turk v. St. Petersburg Bank & Trust Co., 281 So. 2d 534 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1973),
a creditor who repossessed and sold the debtor's automobile was held not entitled to a
deficiency judgment where the defendant was not notified of the sale even though the
corporation, which debtor was president of, was notified. Accord, Leasco Data Processing
Equip. Corp. v. Atlas Shirt Co., 66 Misc. 2d 1089, 323 N.YS.2d 13 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct.
1971). Contra, Universal C.I.T. Credit Co. v. Rone, 248 Ark. 665, 453 S.W.2d 37 (1970).
138. 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 120, at 1264.
139. One study of automobile repossessions revealed that the price obtained at the
sale of repossessed automobiles averaged only 51% of the outstanding claims against the
debtor. Shuchman, supra note 131, at 32. A survey of seven consumer loan companies in
Gainesville, Florida [hereinafter cited as Gainesville Survey] indicated that the sales price
rarely satisfied the unpaid balance. One company responded that in only one out of 150
cases did the sales price satisfy the unpaid balance while another company admitted that
in no case did the sales price satisfy the obligation.
140. The reasonable expenses for repossession and sale of collateral, including attorney's fees, are deducted initially from the proceeds of the disposition of the collateral.

UCC §9-504(1).
141. 38 Misc. 2d 187, 238 N.Y.S.2d 269 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1963).
142. Id. at 189, 238 N.Y.S.2d at 271.
143. Id. See also Schweglar Bros. v. Johnson, 161 Misc. 451, 291 N.YS. 321 (Buffalo

City Ct. 1936).
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the deficiency was disallowed. This case represents an extreme abuse of a
debtor by a creditor, but similar results are possible under the UCC. The UCC
allows the creditor to charge the debtor with all the various expenses mentioned in Aiken 1- 4 and, if the sale of the automobile in Aiken had been found
to be commercially reasonable, the UCC would have permitted the court to
145
grant a deficiency judgment.
Large deficiency judgments are created primarily by artificially low sales
prices for repossessed collateral. 146 In one study of automobile repossessions,
the sales price for repossessed automobiles in good condition averaged only
71 per cent of the wholesale price as determined by the National Automobile
Publisher's Redbook.147 One example of this situation is presented by a case
in which an automobile was purchased for $2,605 and the debtor paid
$1,835 of this purchase price before default. The car was repossessed and
sold for $400, less than half the Redbook retail price. The $400 price served
as the basis for a deficiency judgment. 8 Thus, it has been argued that the
fair market value is a more realistic figure in computing deficiencies than
49
the artifically low forced sales price in the market place.1
Deficiency judgments impose emotional as well as financial burdens on
the consumer-debtor.150 This emotional strain stems from the fact that the
debtor not only has lost his goods, but is also burdened by a large, pending
payment. Constant harassment of the debtor by the creditor contributes to
151
this emotional burden.
Creditors traditionally have argued that the party at fault should bear
these burdens. Consumer advocates believe, however, that the concept of
fault serves no useful purpose. 1 2 Unexpected emergencies such as illness or
loss of job are often the cause of default, 5 3 and the debtor may therefore be
penalized for events beyond his control.
Financial overextension, on the other hand, is a cause of default that
144. UCC §9-504(1)(a).
145. Under the UCC, however, the contract in Aiken would have had to pass the test
of unconscionability found in UCC §2-302. See generally Davenport, UNCONSCIONABiLrrY AND
THE CODE, 22 U. MIAMI L. REV. 121 (1967); Note, Consumer Protection in Florida:Inadequate
Legislative Treatment of Consumer Frauds, 23 U. FLA. L. REV. 528 (1971).
146. See note 139 supra.
147. Shuchman, supra note 131, at 31.
148. Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Thomas, No. CV-7-685-11,988 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1966).
See also Russel Pontiac, Inc. v. Loveleso, No. CV-16-6712-6836 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1967);
Chorches Motors, Inc. v. Sears, No. CV-12-6605-7565 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1966). These cases
are described in Shuchman, supra note 131, at 26-27 K- nn.27, 29-30.
149. See, e.g., Clark, Default, Repossession, Foreclosure, and Deficiency: A Journey to
the Underworld and a Proposed Solution, 51 OE. L. REV. 302, 337 (1972).
150. Davis, Legislative Restriction of Creditor Powers and Remedies: A Case Study
of the Negotiation and Drafting of the Wisconsin Consumer Act, 72 MICH. L. REv. 1, 60
(1973).
151. See generally D. CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MORE 155-67 (1967); Greenfield, Coercive Collection Tactics-An Analysis of the Interests and the Remedies, 1972 WASH. L.Q.
117.
152. See Davis, supra note 150, at 60.
153. D. CAPLOVITZ, supra note 151, at 155-57.
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lies within the control. of both debtor and creditor. Creditors, by advertising
"easy credit" contribute to default caused by overextension. Responsibility for
overextension, however, also rests in the debtor, as default is just as likely
to be the result of debtor dishonesty or capriciousness.1 54 Arguments about
who is more at fault only serve to obscure the central issue in this area-the
inequitable manner in which a deficiency judgment may be obtained..
The proposed uniform acts have been used as a starting point in the drafting of provisions placing limitations on deficiency judgments. The UCC limits
deficiency judgments by providing that if the cash price in a consumer credit
sale is less than $1,000,155 the seller must choose between repossession or
voluntary surrender of the collateral and a suit against the debtor for the
unpaid balance.15 To the extent of the coverage of this provision, the UCCC
returns to the election of remedies doctrine by precluding a deficiency judgment where the seller repossesses the collateral. A loophole, however, does
exist in this provision. If the cash price of the sale is near $1,000, the seller
may be able to manipulate the price to $1,000, thereby avoiding the UCCC's
5
deficiency restriction. 7
The NCA's restriction on deficiency judgments15s differs from the UCCC's
restriction in two significant aspects. First, the NCA ties its restriction to the
unpaid balance at default rather than the cash price of the transaction. 59
Second, the fair market value of the collateral is used to compute the deficiency in cases where such a judgment is permitted. 60
FCFA
The FCFA's deficiency limitation provision adopts the language of the
NCA. The FCFA attempts to remedy the inequities created by deficiency
judgments by eliminating them on small obligations and by requiring the
use of fair market value to compute the deficiency when it is allowed. The
applicable provision states:
If a creditor takes possession of property which was collateral under
a consumer credit transaction, the consumer shall not be personally.
liable to the creditor for any unpaid balance of the obligation unless
154. Kripke, supra note 4, at 447. One possible solution to the problem of overextension
is to offer the consumer credit counseling. This is provided for in the FCFA. FLA. STAT.
§516.32 (1973). See Oeltjen, supra note 12, at 423.
155. UCCC Redraft No. 5 increases the amount to $1,750. Miller & Warren, supra note
53, at 14. Two states adopting the UCCC chose smaller cash price amounts. CAL. REv.
STAT. §73-5-103(2) (Supp. 1971) ($500); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §40-5-103(2) (Supp. 1971) ($500).

156. UCCC §5-103, Comment 3. See Jordan & Warren, supra note 4, at 441. UCCC
§5.103 was held constitutional in Sanco Enterprises, Inc. v. Christian, 495 P.2d 404 (Okla.

1972).
157.

See Davis, supra note 150, at 61-62; Murphy, Lawyers for the Poor View the

UCCC, 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 298, 321 (1969); Shuchman, supra note 131, at 47. See generally
Peoples Fin. & Thrift Co. v. Perry, 30 Utah 2d 282, 516 P.2d 1400 (1973)..
158. NCA §5.211.

159. NCA §5.211(1).
160. NCA §5.212(1).
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the unpaid balance of the consumer's obligation at the time of default
was $2,000 or more. [When the unpaid balance is $2,000 or more] the
creditor shall be entitled to recover from the consumer the deficiency,
if any, resulting from deducting the fair-market value of the collateral
from the unpaid balance due. In a proceeding for a deficiency, the
fair-market value of the collateral shall be a question for the trier of
fact. Periodically published trade estimates of the retail value of goods
shall, to the extent they are recognized in the particular trade or
business, be presumed to be the fair-market value of the collateral.' 61
The FCFA thus prohibits deficiency judgments where the unpaid balance
at default is less than $2,000. This forces the creditor to choose between
repossession and a suit on the debt. 162 The FCFA prohibition on deficiency
16 3
claims, therefore, marks a return to the doctrine of election of remedies.
The FCFA, like the NCA, draws the line in terms of dollar amount at
the unpaid balance. This is a more equitable approach than the cash price
limitation of the UCCC.164 Using the figure of $2,000 reflects the feeling
that:
The major concern of a legitimate creditor is with respect to the
rare consumer who defaults on one of the early payments leaving used
collateral and a rather substantial unpaid balance. It is felt that this
concern is legitimate and should be accommodated, but only to the
extent that a significant transaction is involved. 6 5
This rationale recognizes that the most onerous cases arise where the obligation is small, but given expenses and attorney's fees charged to the debtor,
the deficiency is disproportionately large.1 66 By setting the cutoff point at
which a deficiency judgment may be allowed at an unpaid balance of $2,000,
$500 below the maximum original obligation allowable, 6 the FCFA virtually
eliminates deficiency judgments in the consumer finance context.
By tying the restriction on deficiency judgments to the unpaid balance
at default, the FGFA provision presents the question of what is the "unpaid
balance." Although the legislature drafted the deficiency restriction section
with the NCA as its apparent model, it excluded the accompanying definition
of unpaid balance. The NCA defines "unpaid balance" as the "amount which
the consumer would have been required to pay upon prepayment pursuant
161.

FLA. STAT.

§516.31(3) (1973). The FCFA takes precedence over the UCC by virtue

of the UCC's repealer provisions. FLA. STAT. §§679.203(2), 680.104(2) (1973). Those procedures not covered by the FCFA are still governed by the UCC. Therefore, such matters
as notice, expenses of disposition of the collateral, and debtor's remedies are still controlled by the UCC, art. 9, pt. 5.
162. FLA. STAT. §516.31(3) (1973).
163. See text accompanying notes 117-120 supra.
164. See NCA §5.211, Comment 1. But see Felsenfeld, supra note 4, at 558-59.
165. NCA §5.211, Comment 1.
166. See, e.g., Imperial Discount Corp. v. Aiken, 38 Misc. 2d 187, 238 N.Y.S.2d 269 (N.Y.
City Civ. Ct. 1963). See also Jordan & Warren, supra note 4, at 441.
167. FLA. STAT. §516.031 (1973). An obligation of over $2,500 is possible where licensees
under chapter 516 of Florida Statutes hold commercial paper. Very few consumer purchases, however, with the exception of new automobiles, exceed $2,500.
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to the provisions on rebate upon prepayment (Section 2.210) ."160 Because
the Florida provision otherwise tracks the NCA, this definition should be incorporated into the statute by judicial construction or legislative action to
clarify its meaning.169
Where the unpaid balance at default equals or exceeds $2,000 the creditor
may obtain a deficiency judgment.170 The problem of deflated sales prices
for repossessed collateral is alleviated by computing the deficiency by subtracting the fair market value of the collateral from the unpaid balance, 17
rather than by subtracting the price actually received at the sale of the collateral. To measure fair market value properly, periodically published trade
estimates of the retail value of the collateral will be presumed to be the indicators of fair market value to the extent the trade estimates are recognized
72
in that trade or business.1
The use of published trade estimates of retail value to determine fair
market value has received a generally favorable response. 73 The standard
does have faults, however, particularly when an automobile is collateral.17 4
The calculation of deficiencies based on published trade estimates of
automobile retail value would, in many cases, eliminate the deficiency. Thus,
the burden of depreciation would be shifted to the creditor. 5 It has been
suggested that because the wholesale price is the most that the creditor is likely
to obtain in the marketplace, wholesale value should be dispositive in calculating deficiencies.176 Artificially low prices received by creditors at repossession sales, however, appear to represent more their own inaction than
the true value of the automobile or other collateral.
The chief flaw in the FCFA deficiency restriction is that a creditor suing
for an unpaid balance of less than $2,000 can obtain a judgment for the
amount due and then levy execution on the same property that the creditor
would have repossessed, sold, and then possibly obtained a deficiency against
prior to the enactment of the deficiency restriction.'77 While this procedure

168. NCA §5.211. Section 2.209 provides that the consumer shall have a right to prepayment without penalty. At the time of prepayment, the debtor is entitled to a rebate
of the unearned portion of the finance charges. NCA §2.210(1).
169. The State of Oregon, with a deficiency limitation similar to the FCFA, defines
"unpaid time balance" as the "amount the buyer would have been required to pay if
the buyer's obligation had been paid in full at the time of default." OR. R-v. STAT.

§83.830(2)(a) (1973-1974).
170. FLA. STAT. §516.31(3) (1973).
171. Id.; see NCA §5.212(1). Similar methods of deficiency computation in real property
mortgages have been held constitutional, Gelfert v. National City Bank, 313 U.S. 221 (1941);
Honeyman v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 539 (1939); Richmond Mortgage & Loan Corp. v. Wachovia
Bank & Trust, 300 U.S. 124 (1937).
172. FLA. STAT. §516.31(3) (1973); see NCA §5.212(2).
173. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 149, at 377; Oeltjen, supra note 12, at 412; Shuchman,
supra note 131, at 48.
174. Davis, supra note 150, at 65.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See Oeltjen, supra note 12, at 411.
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may be more cumbersome and expensive, the creditor can still achieve substantially the same result as that the legislature sought to prohibit.
Judicial construction could possibly prevent avoidance of the intent of
the act, but amendment of the deficiency restriction provision would be
preferable. The UCCC offers a solution that the Florida Legislature should
adopt:
If the seller elects to bring an action against the buyer for a debt arising
from a consumer credit sale of goods or services when under this section he would not be entitled to a deficiency judgment if he repossessed
the collateral, and obtains judgment (a) he may not repossess the
collateral, and (b) the collateral is not subject to levy or sale on execution or similar proceedings pursuant to the judgment.17

There is an additional ambiguity in the deficiency judgment provision
of the FCFA. It is unclear whether the debtor can trigger the operation of
the deficiency restrictions by voluntarily surrendering the collateral. This
could be accomplished in the following manner: the debtor would use the
goods to his satisfaction, default, and then voluntarily surrender the collateral
to the creditor. The debtor would then be free from both a suit on the debt
and a deficiency judgment, because the creditor may not sue on the debt or
obtain a deficiency judgment where he "takes possession of property which
was collateral."'17 9 This procedure would require a sophisticated debtor and
a creditor willing to accept possession of the collateral. This interpretation
should not be encouraged because it could give rise to intentional defaultsa result the legislature obviously did not intend. s0
The legislature should clarify the FCFA deficiency judgment limitation
by adequately defining its terminology and closing the discussed loopholes.
Once this is accomplished, a well-defined deficiency limitation can fulfill
its proper social function without placing a severe burden on the consumer
181
finance industry.
COVERAGE

The application of the consumer protection sections of the FCFA is
necessarily limited by the scope of the Act's coverage. Section 516.31(1) of
the FCFA provides that the consumer protection provisions embodied in the
remainder of section 516.31 shall apply "to every consumer credit transaction
and contract in which any form of credit is extended to an individual to purchase or obtain goods or services for use primarily for personal, family, or
178. UCCC §5.103(6).
179. FLA. STAT. §516.31(3) (1973). The FCFA is silent on the point of voluntary surrender but the NCA would permit a voluntary surrender by the debtor with such surrender
being the equivalent of the creditor enforcing his security interests. NCA §5.205.
180. See Clark, supra note 149, at 336.
181. The Gainesville Survey revealed that only two of seven firms sampled changed
their policies in light of the FCFA's deficiency restriction. Only one firm believed that the
FCFA's consumer protection provisions as a whole increased the cost of credit.
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household purposes."'18 2 On its face this language appears to encompass
the entire range of consumer credit activity, including transactions typically
covered by small loan acts, retail installment sales acts, installment sales
finance acts, and similar statutes governing the regulation of credit transactions183 This broad language parallels the definition of "consumer credit
transaction" found in the UCCC184 and the NCA.8 5 The well-publicized
intent of the uniform acts and the similarity of language in these acts and
the scope provision of the FCFA make it apparent that the Florida Legislature
sought to ensure the broadest possible application for the substantive provisions of the consumer protection section. Such pervasive coverage would
have placed Florida in the vanguard of consumer credit protection legislation.18 6
An amendment to the FCFA as originally proposed, however, sounded
the apparent deathknell to such broad coverage.' 8 7 This amendment states:
"Nothing in Chapter 516 shall apply to any transaction, contract, or loan
other than one involving an extension of credit by a licensee as defined in
this chapter."' 88 Licensees as defined by chapter 516 are primarily consumer

loan companies.18 9 Many lenders and retail installment sellers do not fall
within this definition of licensees and thus escape the coverage of the Act.19 0
Despite this limiting amendment, the language of section 516.31 strongly
suggests a legislative intent to extend consumer protection beyond transactions involving consumer loan companies. Section 516.31(2), for example,
deals with holders or assignees of negotiable instruments or installment contracts.19' Consumer finance companies are by no means the major holders
of these types of commercial paper. 92 The effect of this section would be
182. FLA. STAT. §516.31(l) (1973).
183. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§520.31, .51 (1973); Fla. Laws 1949, ch. 25,343, at 751; Fla.
Laws 1925, ch. 10,177, at 346.
184. UCCC §1.301(13) (Working Redraft No. 4) defines "consumer credit transaction"
as "a consumer credit sale or consumer loan or a refinancing thereof, or a consumer lease."
185. NCA §1.301(10) defines "consumer credit transaction" as "a transaction between a
merchant and a consumer in which real or personal property, service or money is acquired
on credit and the consumer's obligation is payable in installments or for which credit
a finance charge is or may be imposed. The term includes consumer credit sales, consumer
loans, consumer leases and transactions pursuant to a seller or lender credit card."
186. Oeltjen, supra note 12, at 399.
187. FLA. S. JoUR. 527 (Reg. Sess. 1973). The amendment was introduced by Senator

Dempsey Barron of Panama City, Fla.
188. FLA.

STAT.

§516.37 (1973).

189. "Consumer loan companies" are synonymous in this note with "consumer finance
companies" and "small loan companies" all of which refer to licensees under the FCFA.
190. "Licensee" as defined by FLA. STAT. §516.01(l)(b) (1973) refers to those persons
making loans of $2,500 or less and receiving interest of more than 10%. FLA. STAT. §516.02
(1973). Excluded from the ambit of chapter 516 are: "[P]erson[s] doing business under and
as permitted by any law of this state or the United States relating to banks, savings banks,
trust companies, building and loan associations, credit unions, industrial loan and investment companies . . . registrant[s] under chapter 519," and pawnbrokers. FLA.

STAT.

§516.01(2) (1973).
191. FLA.

STAT.

§516.31(2) (1973).

192. But cf. FLA. STAT. §516.31(5)

(1973). This section requires licensees under the

FCFA who purchase retail installment contracts to be licensed under chapter 420, The Retail
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curtailed sharply if it were applicable only to consumer loan companies.
Similarly, section 516.31(4) refers to "debts arising from two or more retail
installment sales."' 193 Consumer finance companies do not even engage in
retail installment sales.194 Furthermore, section 516.31(6) speaks of "[w]aiver
by the buyer of any provision in this section."'19s If the original intent of the
legislature had been to limit the consumer protection provisions to consumer
finance companies, the term "borrower" would certainly have been a more
logical choice of language. These discrepancies in draftsmanship obscure the
legislative intent regarding coverage and leave the question open to varying
interpretations.
The dual legislation in force in Florida prior to the adoption of the
FCFA adds little insight into the intended scope of the Act. The predecessors
'of the FCFA were the Small Loan Act and the Consumer Finance Law. 196 The
Small Loan Act was enacted in 1925 to combat "loan sharking. ' '1 9 7 It provided a special classification for lenders of limited amounts of money and
established maximum allowable interest rates for such transactions.98 The
use of consumer credit was not widespread at that time, 9 a so the breadth of
the statute was accordingly limited.
In 1949, when the use of consumer credit was expanding, the Consumer
Finance Law was enacted to supervise and regulate discount and installment
loans. 20 Statutory construction, however, extended coverage of the Consumer
Finance Law to original transactions evidenced by conditional sales agreements, retained title contracts, and other evidences of indebtedness01 It may
Installment Sales Act. See also P. MCCRACKEN, J. MAO & C. FRICKE, supra note 1, at 10
(table 3).
193. FLA. STAT. §516.31(4) (1973) (cross-collateral limitations). Retail installment sales
are not defined in the Retail Installment Sales Act. However, "retail installment contracts"
or "contracts" are defined as "an instrument or instruments reflecting one or more retail
installment transactions entered into in this state pursuant to which goods or services may
be paid for in installments. It does not include a revolving account or an instrument reflecting a sale pursuant thereto." FLA. STAT. §§520.3](7), .51(2) (1973).
194. Consumer finance companies, of course, may hold retail installment contracts purchased from retail installment sellers.
195. FLA. STAT. §516.31(6) (1973) (emphasis added).
196. These laws were repealed by Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-192, §15, at 431.
197. The Preamble to Fla. Laws 1925, ch. 10,177, at 346, stated that the conduct of
the small loan business had been the subject of much complaint and the cause of great
hardship. The legislature, therefore, desired to "suppress the 'Loan Shark' evil." Courts
held that the state had the police power to remedy this evil of "loan sharking." E.g., Beasley
v. Cahoon, 109 Fla. 106, 147 So. 288 (1933). It was held not a denial of equal protection
to single out the small loan industry as the subject of special legislation. See Mutual Loan
Co. v. Martell, 222 U.S. 225 (1911); Jannett v. Windham, 109 Fla. 129, 153 So. 784, afl'd,
Jannett v. Hardie, 290 U.S. 602 (1933).
198. Mason v. City Fin. Co., 113 Fla. 73, 77, 151 So. 521, 522 (1933). Small loan laws
serve the further purpose of attracting legitimate lenders into the small loan industry. B.
CURRAN, supra note 3, at 16.
199. The total consumer credit outstanding in 1930, for example, was only $8 million
compared with over $180 million at the end of 1973. 60 FFD. RESERVE BULL. AS0 (No. 5,

1974).
200.
201.

Fla. Laws 1949, ch. 25,343, §2, at 751 (repealed 1973).
[1957-19581 FLA. Ai-r'Y GE.N. BIENNIAL RP. 283.
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be inferred that by repealing the Consumer Finance Law in conjunction with
the enactment of the FCFA, the legislature intended that such transactions
be included within the scope of the new Act.
The ambiguous coverage of the FCFA is unfortunate. If the Act applies
only to consumer finance companies, the restrictions on holders of negotiable
instruments are minimal. Finance companies hold only a small portion of
the outstanding consumer paper in the United States. 20 ? The language of the
FCFA, by placing the major holders of consumer paper beyond reach of the
holder in due course provision and by allowing a loophole through which
those who are covered can also avoid the Act's reach, 20 3 may critically limit
the effect of the sanctions contained in the holder of due course section.
Limiting application of the deficiency judgment provision to consumer
finance companies could result in even less meaningful coverage than that
provided by the holder in due course section. Consumer loan companies
rarely seek the remedy of repossession,2 0 4 which is the starting point from
which deficiency judgments evolve. Finance company spokesmen argue that
even where repossession is effected, they always seek the maximum sales
price for the security.205 Banks and retail installment sellers, two primary
beneficiaries of deficiency judgments, are not within the definition of licensees
under chapter 516,206 and are therefore beyond the reach of the deficiency
restriction section. As with the holder in due course restrictions, those who
should be the primary targets of the legislation are left unscathed by its
sanctions.
The limiting amendment was a compromise between the conflicting
economic interests incident to consumer credit transactions. Creditors have
continually argued that restriction of deficiency judgments and holder in
due course status prevents lenders from operating in low income areas.
Demand for many consumer durables can be satisfied only by extension of
credit from consumer loan companies. 20 7 Thus, if credit industry predictions
prove accurate, 20 8 the resulting increase in the cost of credit may be accompanied by concomitant social costs. The role of the credit industry in
our society cannot be underestimated. As one commentator has stated:

202. Consumer finance companies hold only 9% of the outstanding installment credit
in the United States. P. MCCRACKEN, J. MAO & C. FRICKE, supTa note 1, at 8 (table 2).
203. See text accompanying notes 57-59 supra.
204. All seven of the loan companies in the Gainesville Survey indicated that instead of
repossession they usually file suit against a defaulting party.
205. Davis, supra note 150, at 167. The drafters of the UCCC excluded loans altogether
from their deficiency limitation. UCCC §5.103.
206. See note 190 supra.
207. See Kripke, supra note 4, at 479.
208. It is argued that curbs on deficiency judgments may result in increased investigation costs and ultimately an increase in the cost of consumer credit. See, e.g., Turner &
Forbes, supra note 98, at 114. This argument appears sound, but there have been minimal
data to substantiate this contention. Only one of the seven consumer loan companies
questioned in the Gainesville Survey noted any increase in the cost of credit or any
change in the investigatory procedures as a result of the FCFA.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1975

25

Florida Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 2 [1975], Art. 6
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVI I

If a realignment of debtor-creditor law requires that the debtor be
protected against unscrupulous creditors, it conversely should require
that creditor and public interests be protected against unscrupulous
debtors. Consumerism must advance beyond the quixotic view so often
taken by the media and aspiring politicians that equates any victory of
any consumer over a business interest, regardless of how unfounded
and undeserving, with furtherance of the public interest. The importance of credit to our over-all productivity is deserving of more
than passing interest.209
The entire context of the FCFA must be kept in mind, however, when
the consumer credit industry decries the increased financial burdens placed
on its shoulders by the consumer protection provisions, for the FCFA gave the
industry an increase in chargeable interest rates 210 and a fourfold increase
21 1
in the maximum permissible loan.

CONCLUSION

Florida has taken an important step toward the goal of a just and
efficient system of consumer credit laws. The significant departure from
existing law in the areas of the holder in due course doctrine and deficiency
judgments represents a legislative recognition of the need for increased
consumer protection. As the FCFA now reads, however, this need remains
unfulfilled.
The protection afforded consumers by both the holder in due course section and the deficiency judgment provision is rendered inadequate by obvious
loopholes in construction. Additionally, the entire consumer protection provision is fraught with ill-defined and interchangeable terminology. Clarification of the legislature's intent in these areas is sorely needed.
The overriding defect in the FCFA is the arbitrary limitation on its
coverage. Reading the expansive coverage of section 516.31(l) in pari materia212
with the other provisions of the FCFA leads inexorably toward the conclusion that the coverage of the FCFA is limited to consumer finance companies.213 The policy of singling out these small loan companies for piecemeal legislation should be reexamined. Justice and efficiency demand that

209. Williams, Creditors' Prejudgment Remedies: Expanding Strictures on Traditional
Rights, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 60, 111 (1972).
210. FLA. STAT. §516.031 (1973).
211. Id. The maximum loan was increased from $600 to $2,500.
212. Statutes relating to the same person or thing or a closely allied subject are regarded as in pari materia. Singleton v. Larson, 46 So. 2d 186, 190 (Fla. 1950). See also
Okaloosa County Water & Sewer Dist. v. Hellburn, 160 So. 2d 43, 45 (Fla. 1964).
213. The language used in the statute should be construed to give consideration to the
purpose of the law as evidenced by all parts of a given act. See, e.g., Florida Jai Alai, Inc.
v. Lake Howell Water & Reclamation Dist., 274 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 1973). This is particularly
true where the statute under consideration has been enacted by the same legislature as a
part of a single act, as with the consumer protection section of the FCFA. See Major v.
State, 180 So. 2d 335, 337 (Fla, 1965); Ex parte Perry, 71 Fla. 250, 255-56, 71 So. 174, 176 (1916).
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